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REYNOLDS v. UNITED STATES: THE 
HISTORICAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL REALITY 
Donald L. Drakeman* 
In the Supreme Court's first case interpreting the Constitu-
tion's free exercise clause, Chief Justice Morrison Waite en-
dowed the next two centuries of religion clause jurisprudence 
with a generous legacy of constitutional history. In that 1879 
case, Reynolds v. United States, the Chief Justice called upon the 
founding fathers to decide whether polygamous Mormons in the 
Territory of Utah were immunized by their faith from prosecu-
tion under a federal statute outlawing bigamy.1 The Court's rul-
ing offered Mr. Reynolds, a minor Mormon official, no hope of 
sanctuary within the First Amendment. More important than 
this specific decision, however, was the historical approach to in-
terpreting the religion clauses adopted by the Chief Justice, 
which has had the effect of essentially writing Thomas Jefferson 
and James Madison directly into the First Amendment. Not just 
any aspects of these two influential framers were incorporated 
into constitutional doctrine, but their writings that have come to 
stand for the principle of a strict separation of church and state: 
Two documents from colonial Virginia-Madison's Memorial 
and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments and Jefferson's 
Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom-together with Jeffer-
son's now-famous letter to a group of Danbury, Connecticut, 
Baptists, declaring that the First Amendment erected a "wall of 
separation between church and state." 
The opinion's expansive language about "the true distinc-
tion between what properly belongs to the church and what to 
the State," and its striking assertion that Jefferson's 1802 letter 
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lege; J.D., Columbia Law School; M.A., Ph.D., Princeton University. I am grateful for 
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to the Danbury Baptists represents almost "an authoritative dec-
laration of the scope and effect" of the First Amendment have 
created an enduring historical heritage not so much for the free 
exercise clause, but for the First Amendment's non-
establishment provision.2 While the establishment clause itself 
does not make its Supreme Court debut for another fifty years 
or so, the legacy of Reynolds is the extent to which it has cast a 
strict separationist hue on the First Amendment in a manner 
that has colored church-state constitutional analysis ever since, 
much to the consternation of those who would prefer an inter-
pretation allowing the government to provide at least non-
denominational support for religion. This group, generally called 
non-preferentialists or accommodationists, has engaged the his-
torical debate, often arguing that the historical premise in Rey-
nolds was correct-i.e., that Jefferson and Madison can tell us 
what the religion clauses mean-but asserting that a focus solely 
on the specific documents unearthed by Chief Justice Waite tell 
only part of the story, since even those framers had a record of 
approving some state support for religion. Some have even ar-
gued that the concept of Madisonian authorship of the religion 
clauses is wrong-headed, and that other members of the first 
Congress, such as New Hampshire's Samuel Livermore, deserve 
the credit. 
My goal is not to add yet another voice to this sometimes fe-
rocious fray, especially since there is abundant scholarly litera-
ture and a lengthy series of judicial opinions all questing for the 
historical First Amendment. Instead, my aim is to address a very 
different question, viz.: In an era during which the Supreme 
Court rarely consulted the founding fathers on constitutional is-
sues, where did the Chief Justice find the historical sources that 
led him to such interesting and, ultimately, influential writings? 
The answer is, briefly: He consulted the greatest American his-
torian of the nineteenth century, George Bancroft. Once di-
rected to Virginia by Dr. Bancroft, who probably focused on that 
state because he was a devoted admirer of Thomas Jefferson, the 
Chief Justice came under the direct influence of two native Vir-
ginian historians. These historians shared the view that the Old 
2. The first modem establishment clause case, Everson 11. Board of Education of 
Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), reh'g denied, 330 U.S. 855 (1947), reaffirmed the statements in 
Reynolds that the "provisions of the First Amendment, in the drafting and adoption of 
which Madison and Jefferson played such leading roles, had the same objective and in-
tended to provide the same protection against governmental intrusion on religious liberty 
as the Virginia [Bill of Religious Uberty)." 330 U.S. at 13. 
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Dominion was indeed the font of American freedoms. They also 
happened to be Baptist and Presbyterian ministers whose ardent 
opposition to ecclesiastical establishments was inspired by the 
dissenting churches' persecution at the hands of a legally estab-
lished church, the "Nebuchadnezzars of the age."3 And so, the 
Supreme Court's historical reading of the establishment clause 
owes as much to the Baptists' and Presbyterians' battles for reli-
gious freedom-and their historians' artful telling of that tale-
as it does to the intellectual contributions of Jefferson and Madi-
son. 
Ever since Reynolds, a detailed discussion of constitutional 
history has frequently been a hallmark of church-state cases, 
leading advocates on all sides to cite those framers who appear 
to support their views and to criticize their opponents for mis-
reading or misrepresenting the legislative history. Despite much 
of this modern commentary decrying the misuse of the historical 
record, however, what we are witnessing in Reynolds is not really 
"law office history," in the classic sense of a litigant (or judge) 
sifting through eighteenth-century documents to find historical 
nuggets in support of a favored outcome in a pending case. Chief 
Justice Waite was not searching for any particular position along 
the strict separationist-non-preferentialist axis, and none was 
needed to decide how to apply the free exercise clause to the 
case of a Mormon polygamist. Instead of law office history, what 
we see in Reynolds might better be termed the historical con-
struction of constitutional reality. That is, Chief Justice Waite of-
fered a good faith, but probably flawed (or at least oversimpli-
fied), rendition of the amendment's origins, and then the history 
he found became the relevant constitutional background for fu-
ture cases not because it was an accurate picture of the estab-
lishment clause's original meaning, but because subsequent Su-
preme Court decisions said that it was. It was only later, in the 
wake of the Supreme Court's decisions applying the First 
Amendment to parochial school aid, school prayer and other 
state and local actions, that litigants, judges and even historians 
began to excavate the Jeffersonian-Madisonian landscape to un-
earth constitutional artifacts that might support their most de-
sired results in hotly contested cases about public aid to religion. 
3. ROBERT B. SEMPLE, A HISTORY OF 1liE RISE AND PROGRESS OF 11iE BAPTISTS IN 
VIRGINIA 11 (1810). 
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THE BACKGROUND 
In the early 1860's, Congress passed the "Morrill Act for the 
Suppression of Polygamy," which went well beyond simply ban-
ning multiple spouses. The Morrill Act not only outlawed plural 
marriages in the territories, it also sought essentially to disestab-
lish the Mormon Church and to divest it of its economic power.4 
Despite these aggressive provisions, the Act was declared a 
"dead letter" by a congressional committee five years later be-
cause it could not be enforced effectively at the Mormon-
dominated local level.5 Following the Civil War, Congressional 
attention was focused again on polygamy. In 1874, the federal 
Poland Act was adopted, and this law cleverly provided the 
prosecutorial mechanisms that were missing from the somnolent 
Morrill Act. The Poland Act allowed the U.S. Marshal in Utah 
to select jury pools that would not necessarily bow to the pres-
sure of the Mormon Church, assigned jurisdiction of polygamy 
trials to federal territorial courts and provided for polygamy 
convictions to be appealable to the United States Supreme 
Court.6 
Not long after Congress passed the Poland Act, several 
Mormon leaders were arrested by a federal prosecutor. They de-
cided that a test case was necessary, preferably one involving 
someone with a relatively low profile in the community, a defen-
dant who might present a more sympathetic image than one of 
the Church's elder statesmen with a bevy of young wives. And 
so, on October 16, 1874, 32 year old George Reynolds wrote in 
his diary that "it had been decided to bring a test case of the law 
of 1862 ... before the court and ... to present my name before 
the grand jury."7 Reynolds, the private secretary to a series of 
Mormon presidents, and a polygamist for a grand total of two 
months at that time, did what he was asked. He was indicted by a 
grand jury for bigamy on the grounds that in 1865 he had mar-
ried Mary Ann Tuddenham and then, in August of 1874, "did 
unlawfully marry and take to wife one Amelia Jane Schofield."8 
4. 12 Stat. 501-02 (1862). See SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON 
QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLJCf IN NINETEENTH CENTURY 
AMERICA 81 (2002). 
5. GORDON, supra note 4, at 83 (quoting the Report From the Committee on the 
Judiciary, 28 February 1867, responding to the "Memorial of the Legislative Assembly of 
the Territory of Utah, Praying for the Repeal of [the 1862 Act]"). 
6. 18 Stat. 669-71. See also GORDON, supra note 4, at 113. 
7. GoRDON, supra note 4, at 114. 
8. The indictment is reprinted in full in the Brief for the United States, in 8 
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
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At trial, a parade of remarkably forgetful Mormon witnesses, 
upon being quizzed about Reynolds' alleged multiple marriages, 
displayed a level of collective amnesia that we have come to as-
sociate with events like the Watergate hearings, and denied any 
knowledge of the two marriages. He was nevertheless convicted 
on the testimony of his second wife, Amelia Jane Reynolds (nee 
Schofield), who had apparently not been expected to be called as 
a witness. Not knowing to follow the party line, she proceeded 
blithely to recall that she had, in fact, married George Reynolds 
on "the third day of August, 1874 ... [i]n the Endowment House" 
in Salt Lake City.9 Reynolds' conviction was reversed on appeal 
on procedural grounds, and he was tried again. At the new trial, 
Reynolds' second wife could not be found to give testimony, so 
her statements in the first trial were read into the record, and 
Reynolds was convicted again. With this background, his case 
reached the Supreme Court late in 1878. 
THE CASE 
The Reynolds case would take the Court into uncharted 
constitutional waters, since the federal government had not pre-
viously been involved in regulating either domestic relations or 
individuals' religious conduct, both of which had historically 
been the sole province of the state governments. Thirty years be-
fore, in the one early nineteenth century case in which the First 
Amendment's free exercise clause had been invoked, the Court 
made it clear that the states were not subject to the mandates of 
the First Amendment. This case, Permoli v. New Orleans, in-
volved an ordinance stating that "it shall be unlawful to carry to, 
and expose in, any of the Catholic churches of this municipality, 
any corpse, under the penalty of a fine of fifty dollars." The Su-
preme Court dismissed a challenge to the ordinance on First 
Amendment grounds, decreeing that "[t]he Constitution makes 
no provision for protecting the citizens of the respective states in 
their religious liberties; this is left to the state constitutions and 
laws: nor is there any inhibition imposed by the Constitution of 
the United States in this respect on the states."10 Nineteenth cen-
tury Americans could therefore seek no recourse from the state 
STATES 71 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper, eds., 1975). 
9. !d. at 46. 
10. Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of the City of New Orleans, 44 U.S. 589, 609 
(1845). 
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or federal courts via appeals to the First Amendment for protec-
tion from laws promulgated by the states. 
In Mr. Reynolds' case, the situation was quite different. 
Utah was not a state at that time, and, in fact, Brigham Young 
had unsuccessfully petitioned for the Mormon homeland to be-
come the state of Deseret. Utah was instead a territory of the 
United States, and subject to federal jurisdiction, thus putting 
Congress in the position usually occupied by state governments: 
it could freely legislate on marriage and other matters tradition-
ally left to the states, as it did in the Morrill Act. But, at the same 
time, such legislation would need to conform to the mandates of 
the Constitution's limitations on federal power, thus potentially 
bringing to bear upon any convictions under the Morrill Act the 
untested provisions of the First Amendment's religion clauses. 
Accordingly, Chief Justice Waite identified as one of the six 
questions to be addressed by the Court: "Should the accused 
have been acquitted if he married the second time, because he 
believed it to be his religious duty?" 
Chief Justice Waite began his analysis by observing that the 
First Amendment is in fact implicated by Mr. Reynolds' appeal: 
"Congress cannot pass a law for the government of the Territo-
ries which shall prohibit the free exercise of religion. The First 
Amendment to the Constitution expressly forbids such legisla-
tion."11 The question before the Court, then, was "whether the 
law now under consideration comes within this prohibition."12 
To answer this constitutional question of first impression, the 
Chief Justice turned to a historical analysis of the origins of the 
religion clauses. He launched this discussion with the following 
rationale: "The word 'religion' is not defined in the Constitution. 
We must go elsewhere, therefore, to ascertain its meaning and 
nowhere more appropriately, we think, than to the history of the 
times in the midst of which the provision was adopted." 13 
Why did Chief Justice Waite elect to employ a "history of 
the times" methodology to interpret the First Amendment? It 
was certainly not a necessary component of First Amendment 
analysis at that point in constitutional history. In dealing with 
free speech cases of first impression, the Waite court did not 
seek out the framers' views or intentions/4 and, when Justice 
11. Reynolds, 98 U.S. 143, 160 (1878). 
12. !d. 
13. !d. 
14. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877), involving mail restrictions on circulars 
relating to lotteries. See also Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 {1882} where neither Waite's 
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Bradley referenced the "views of the first congress" in an 1886 
search and seizure case, a concurring opinion joined by Chief 
Justice Waite made only a vague reference to what was "obvi-
ous" that the framers intended without citing any historical evi-
dence.15 And so, the degree to which the Chief Justice delved 
into a detailed analysis of the historical background of the relig-
ion clauses is quite unusual. 
Although we do not know why Chief Justice Waite elected 
to make a foray into constitutional history in Reynolds, we do 
know where he went to seek out the information he needed-he 
went next door. Or, more precisely, he went to his former next-
door neighbor from his first year on the Court: seventy-eight 
year old George Bancroft, an elder statesman of formidable in-
fluence and, more importantly, probably the most distinguished, 
and almost certainly the most productive, historian of his genera-
tion.16 Bancroft, who attended Harvard and received a Ph.D. 
from the University of Gottingen, published a ten volume His-
tory of the United States from the Discovery of the Continent; 
served as Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of War; was ap-
pointed minister to Great Britain and Prussia; and, at the time of 
the Reynolds case, made his home in Washington where he had 
dedicated himself to writing what would become a two volume 
History of the Formation of the Constitution of the United States 
of America, a work that was completed just three years after the 
Reynolds case was decided.17 Waite's most recent biographer, C. 
Peter Magrath, describes the politically connected historian as a 
"nineteenth-century Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.," but even that dis-
tinction probably understates the impressive degree of Ban-
croft's stature and the extent of his political influence. In 1879, 
for example, he was given the unprecedented honor of being 
granted "the full privileges of the Senate floor. "18 George Ban-
opinion nor Bradley's dissenting opinion referenced the framers in a case involving po-
litical contributions; in fact, Waite overlooked the potential first amendment issue alto-
gether. 
15. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
16. Bruce Trimble seems to be the first to pick up on Bancroft's influence on the 
Reynolds opinion. See BRUCE R. TRIMBLE, CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE: DEFENDER OF THE 
PUBIC INTEREST 244-45 (1938). But the relationship is described in substantially greater 
detail in C. Peter Magrath, "Chief Justice Waite and the Twin Relic: Reynolds v. United 
States," 18 V AND. L. REV. 507 (1965). 
17. See GEORGE BANCROFT, HlsroRY OF TiiE UNITED STATES FROM THE DISCOVERY 
OF 1liE CoNTINENT (1834-1875) (ten volumes); GEORGE BANCROFT, HISTORY OF THE 
FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
(1882). 
18. Magrath, supra note 16, at 526. 
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croft could, perhaps, be better imagined as Arthur Schlesinger, 
Jr. and Henry Kissinger combined into one august and politically 
hot-wired personage. It would be hard to imagine a more knowl-
edgeable or reputable source for constitutional history than 
Morrison Waite's erstwhile next-door neighbor, who described 
himself as being on "the most friendly terms" with the Chief Jus-
tice.19 
In a brief letter, Bancroft referred the Chief Justice to 
Thomas Jefferson's Virginia Statute on Religious Freedom as 
follows: "The Virginia law, which guided the Virginia members 
of the [constitutional ratifying] convention, shows the opinion of 
the leading American Statesmen in 1785 .... It was accepted 
alike b~ the friends of Jefferson, and the Presbyterians of Vir-
ginia." Following Bancroft's clue that the meaning of the First 
Amendment lay in Virginia's efforts to establish religious free-
dom, Waite dug deeply into a study of the history of Virginia at 
that time. Such an ambitious and time-consuming approach to 
legal research was not uncommon for the Yale-educated jurist. 
Magrath points out that "Waite characteristically sought assis-
tance from any possibly useful source. Thus, in preparing an 
opinion in a case involving matters of international law, he asked 
questions ... of [a State Department official], examined twenty-
two scholarly authorities, and looked at twenty United States 
treaties with foreign nations. "21 In fact, Magrath goes on to note 
that when, late in his Supreme Court career, Chief Justice Waite 
presided over The Telephone Cases, "which dealt with the ex-
ceedingly complex and technical questions raised by the suits 
over the infringements of the Bell telephone patents," he dedi-
cated several months to becoming "educated ... on the princi-
ples of electricity. "22 
We do not know all the sources Waite may have consulted 
to form his opinion about the Virginia antecedents of the First 
Amendment, but his historical research must have represented a 
significant amount of effort over the Christmas holidays, since 
Bancroft's advice came on December 2 and the Chief Justice's 
docket book shows that the Supreme Court approved his opin-
ion in the Reynolds case one month later on January 4, just prior 
19. !d. 
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to its announcement on January 6.23 On January 4, presumably 
shortly after the Court approved the opinion, Waite wrote to 
Bancroft thanking him "again" for "the information given as to 
the history of the free religion clause in the constitution .... 
With your assistance, I have been able to set forth, somewhat 
clearly, I hope, the scope and effect of that provision."24 
Based on his research into the First Amendment's antece-
dents, Waite's majority opinion in the Reynolds case launched 
into a relatively detailed discussion of those aspects of pre-
constitutional history to which he had been referred by Bancroft. 
In particular, the Chief Justice addressed the time when "at-
tempts were made in some of the colonies and States to legislate 
not only in respect to the establishment of religion, but in respect 
to its doctrines and precepts as well."25 He noted that people 
were taxed to raise money for the support of churches other than 
their own and that "[p]unishments were prescribed for a failure 
to attend upon public worship, and sometimes for entertaining 
heretical opinions. "26 Ultimately, he observed that "controversy 
upon this general subject was animated in many of the States, 
but seemed at last to culminate in Virginia," where, in 1784, the 
legislature first considered "a bill establishing provision for 
teachers of the Christian religion .... "27 The bill, known as a 
General Assessment, was postponed and copies were distributed 
so that people could "signify their opinion" at the next session.28 
In response, there was, according to Waite, a "determined oppo-
sition" that included what would become a very famous Memo-
rial and Remonstrance by James Madison "in which he demon-
strated 'that religion, or the duty we owe the Creator,' was not 
within the cognizance of civil government."29 Here Waite cited 
the Appendix to Semple's Virginia Baptists, which contains a 
complete copy of Madison's Memorial. He then noted not only 
that the General Assessment Bill was, in fact, defeated, "but an-
other, 'for establishing religious freedom,' drafted by Mr. Jeffer-
son, was passed."30 At this point, Waite cited both Jefferson's 
23. /d. at 523. 
24. Letter from Chief Justice Waite to George Bancroft (Jan. 4, 1879), quoted in id. 
at 527. 
25. Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878). 
26. /d. 
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collected works and Howison's History ofVirginia.31 Then Waite 
quoted directly from the preamble to Jefferson's Virginia stat-
ute, boldly stating that in "these two sentences is found the true 
distinction between what properly belongs to the church and 
what to the State."32 His description of Jefferson's preamble 
reads as follows: 
After a recital 'that to suffer the civil magistrate to intrude his 
powers into the field of opinion, and to restrain the profession 
or propagation of principles on supposition of their ill ten-
dency, is a dangerous fallacy which at once destroys all reli-
gious liberty,' it is declared 'that it is time enough for the right-
ful purposes of civil government for its officers to interfere 
when princfgles break out into overt acts against peace and 
good order. 
Waite later returned to the topic of what to do when reli-
gious actions, in Jefferson's words, "break out into overt acts 
against peace and good order," but first he needed to establish a 
link between the efforts to secure religious freedom in Virginia 
and the mandates of the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. Bancroft's correspondence had only mentioned 
that Jefferson's statute "guided the Virginia members of the 
[constitutional ratifying] convention [and] shows the opinion of 
the leading American Statesmen in 1785 .... "34 The first link 
proffered by Waite picked up on Bancroft's reference to ratifica-
tion. The Constitutional Convention, Waite commented, oc-
curred "a little more than a year after the passage of this [Vir-
ginia] statute."35 Then, noting that Thomas Jefferson was 
minister to France at that time, and therefore unavailable to play 
a direct role in the creation of the Constitution, Waite observed 
that as soon as Jefferson "saw the draft of the Constitution pro-
posed for adoption, he, in a letter to a friend, expressed his dis-
appointment at the absence of an express declaration insuring 
the freedom of religion. "36 Nevertheless, Jefferson was willing to 
support the Constitution, "trusting that the good sense and hon-
est intentions of the people would bring about the necessary al-
31. ROBERT HOWISON, HisTORY OF VIRGINIA FROM ITS DISCOVERY AND SETI1.EMENT 
BY EUROPEANS TO THE PREsENTnME (1848) (2 volumes). 
32. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 163. 
33. Id. (emphasis added). 
34. Letter from George Bancroft to Chief Justice Waite {Dec. 2, 1878), quoted in 
Magrath, supra note 16, at 527. 
35. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 163. 
36. Id. 
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terations."37 Waite then stated that five states proposed adding 
amendments to the Constitution, and that three of them-New 
Hampshire, New York and Virginia-"included in one form or 
another a declaration of religious freedom in the changes they 
desired to have made, as did also North Carolina, where the 
convention at first declined to ratify the Constitution until the 
proposed amendments were acted upon. "38 
Amendments were indeed proposed during the first session 
of Congress, and "the amendment now under consideration," 
according to the Chief Justice, "was proposed with others by Mr. 
Madison. "39 This amendment "met the views of the advocates of 
religious freedom, and was adopted. "40 And then, following this 
brief summary of the actions of the first Congress, Waite re-
turned to Jefferson, and, in particular, to a letter written to the 
Danbury Baptist Association of Connecticut. The letter, which 
contains Jefferson's oft-quoted statement that the First Amend-
ment built "a wall of separation between church and state," was 
penned in 1802, more than a decade after the adoption and rati-
fication of the First Amendment, but in it Waite finds the heart 
and soul of the religion clauses.41 Quoting at length from the let-
ter, the Chief Justice proclaimed that "[c]orning as this does 
from an acknowledged leader of the advocates of the measure, it 
may be accepted almost as an authoritative declaration of the 
scope and effect of the amendment thus secured."42 Waite's ex-
tensive quotation of Jefferson's letter is as follows: 
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely 
between man and his God; that he owes account to none 
other for his faith or his worship; that the legislative powers of 
the government reach actions only, and not opinions,-! con-
template with sovereign reverence that act of the whole 
American people which declared that their legislature should 
'make no law respecting an establishment of religion or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of 
separation between church and State. Adhering to this ex-
pression of the supreme will of the nation in behalf of the 
rights of conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction the 
progress of those sentiments which tend to restore man to all 
his natural rights, convinced he has no natural right in opposi-
37. !d. 
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tion to his social duties.43 
With this long quotation, and the pronouncement that it stands 
as "almost an authoritative declaration of the scope and effect of 
the [first] amendment," Waite effectively wrote Jefferson's 1802 
"wall of separation" language directly into the religion clauses, 
an emanation that has survived throughout many subsequent 
cases. 
Since Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptists appears not 
to be mentioned in the histories cited by Waite (i.e., Howison 
and Semple), nor is it mentioned in Bancroft's letter, an interest-
ing question is where did the Chief Justice find it.44 The most 
likely source is the Index to the edition of Jefferson's papers 
employed by Waite, that is, the nine volume compilation edited 
in the mid-nineteenth century by Professor H. A. Washington of 
the College of William and Mary. In Washington's Index, there 
is a heading for "Religion," under which there is a subheading 
titled "Religion Should be Free"; and appearing as the first of 
three letters listed under that highly relevant subheading is a ref-
erence to the "wall of separation" letter to the Danbury Bap-
tists.45 And thus entered into the First Amendment lexicon Jef-
ferson's elegant but enigmatic phrase. 
With this enduring contribution to constitutional history, 
the Chief Justice commenced a relatively detailed discussion of 
the history of laws against polygamy, dating back to the common 
law (for which he cites Kent's Commentaries) and the "earliest 
history of England."46 But he was not finished with his invoca-
tion of the history of Virginia. "It is a significant fact," he noted, 
43. !d. Justice Waite's opinion inaccurately transcribes one word of Jefferson's letter. 
See DANIELL. DREISBAlli, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THEW ALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN 
CHURCH AND STATE 181 n.71 (2002), where he notes that "[m)ost published collections of 
Jefferson's writings incorrectly transcribe ["legitimate") as 'legislative."' 
44. Neither Magrath, who has studied Waite extensively, nor Dreisbach, who has 
scrutinized the heritage of the Danbury letter with care, has identified a source who may 
have brought the letter to Waite's attention. Dreisbach notes, "Neither the Danbury let-
ter in general nor the 'wall' metaphor in particular appeared in the formal record before 
The Court, including lower court rulings and the parties' legal briefs." DREISBACH, supra 
note 43, at 98. Magrath comments as follows: "Exactly how Waite came across the letter 
to the Danbury Baptists is not clear. Bancroft may have referred him to it in a conversa-
tion, or Waite, who worked very systematically, may have decided to track down Jeffer-
son's later statements on the first amendment once he had looked at the Virginia Statute 
on Religious Freedom." Magrath, supra note 16 at 530 n.lll. 
45. THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: PUBLISHED BY ORDER OF CONGRESS 
FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPTS DEPOSITED IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE (H.A. 
Washington ed., 1853-1856) (9 volumes); the reference is found at 8 id. at 113. 
46. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164 (citing JAMES KENT, 2 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN 
LAW 79 (1851)). 
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"that ... after the passage of the act establishing religious free-
dom, and after the convention of Virginia had recommended as 
an amendment to the Constitution ... the declaration in a bill of 
rights that 'all men have an equal, natural, and unalienable right 
to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of con-
science,' the (Virginia] legislature substantially enacted the [anti-
polygamy] statute of James 1., death penalty included," there be-
ing apparently some doubt "whether bigamy or polygamy be 
punishable by the laws" of Virginia.47 Based on the fact that Vir-
ginia's great leaders of religious freedom passed such a draco-
nian anti-polygamy law, Waite concluded that "we think it may 
safely be said there never has been a time in any State of the Un-
ion when polygamy has not been an offence against society .... 
In the face of all this evidence, it is impossible to believe that the 
constitutional guaranty of religious freedom was intended to 
prohibit legislation in respect to this most important feature of 
social life."48 Waite then reflected on the nature of marriage, 
which is both a "sacred obligation" and a "civil contract," and 
"[u]pon it society may be said to be built."49 Moreover, Waite 
noted that polygamy "leads to the patriarchal principle ... 
which, when applied to large communities, fetters the people in 
stationary despotism," citing Professor Francis Lieber, whose 
comments on ~olygamy he found strongly endorsed in Kent's 
Commentaries. 0 Ultimately, Waite concluded that "there can-
not be a doubt that, unless restricted by some form of constitu-
tion, it is within the legitimate scope of the power of every civil 
government to determine whether polygamy or monogamy shall 
be the law of social life under its dominion."51 
Since the United States thus has the power to outlaw polyg-
amy, according to Chief Justice Waite, "the only question which 
remains is, whether those who make polygamy a part of their re-
ligion are excepted from the operation of the statute. "52 The pos-
sibility of creating an exemption to the criminal laws for relig-
iously inspired conduct "would be introducing a new element 
into criminal law," which Waite was unprepared to do.53 "Laws," 
he wrote, "are made for the government of actions, and while 
47. ld. at 165. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. ld. at 166 (citing lAMES KENT, 2 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 81 n.(e) 
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they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, 
they may with practices."54 Waite then reviewed the parade of 
potential outrageous results that could flow from allowing reli-
gious exemptions to otherwise valid criminal laws: "suppose one 
believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious 
worship ... [ o ]r if a wife religiously believed it was her duty to 
burn herself upon the funeral pile of her dead husband, would it 
be beyond the power of the civil government to ~revent" these 
beliefs to be carried out into practice, he asked. 5 No, he con-
cluded, to permit "a man to excuse his practices" contrary to the 
laws "would be to make the professed doctrines of religious be-
lief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every 
citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist 
only in name under such circumstances. "56 And so, despite 
Waite's thoughtful analysis of the efforts of Madison and Jeffer-
son to establish religious freedom first in Virginia and subse-
quently in the United States of America, George Reynolds lost 
his case. He did not receive an exemption from the federal laws 
criminalizing bigamy in the territories, and the Mormon's test 
case was lost. 
THE HISTORY 
There is little doubt that Bancroft provided the springboard 
for Waite's plunge into Virginia's history. Following Bancroft's 
reference to Virginia's history and its legal protection of reli-
gious freedom in particular, Waite undoubtedly sought a de-
tailed and reliable historical review of the passage of Jefferson's 
bill. Based on the books cited in the Reynolds opinion, the most 
influential work he consulted was written by Robert Reid 
Howison, described by a recent biographer as "a nineteenth-
century lawyer, minister, historian and author .... "57 
In Howison's History of Virginia from its Discovery and Set-
tlement by Europeans to the Present Time, Chief Justice Waite 
found a relatively recent and generally well regarded source (it 
was published just thirty years earlier in 1848) to provide the his-
torical background of Virginia's disestablishment of the Episco-
54. ld. 
55. ld. 
56. Id. at 166--67. 
57. Trina A. Stephens, Abstract, Twice Forty Years of Learning: An Educational 
Biography of Robert Reid Howison (1820-1906) (1998), (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Virginia Tech.). 
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pal Church and its statutory protection of religious freedom. The 
Princeton Review called it "incomparably the best history of Vir-
ginia that has ever been written," and the Richmond, Virginia, 
based Southern Literary Messenger opined that "[a]s to the per-
spicuity of arrangement, the harmony of proportion between the 
parts, and the accuracy of facts, of Mr. Howison's history, there 
can be but one opinion. In these particulars he has performed his 
task in a manner altogether unexceptionable."58 At the same 
time, Waite came into contact with the work of an able historian, 
an ardent admirer and native son of the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia, and an advocate of the disestablishmentarian view that 
"liberty is weakened by any contact between church and state. "59 
Howison clearly shared Bancroft's opinion that Jefferson's 
statute was a profound statement following "the highest reason," 
and further believed that, in pressing for amendments to the 
federal constitution, Virginia was "instrumental in securing lib-
erty for America."60 Unlike Bancroft, however, Howison did not 
read this history as necessarily reflecting a personal triumph of 
Thomas Jefferson himself, or even the preeminence of Jefferson-
ian republicanism, but, rather, the contribution of Virginia to the 
new nation. Howison, a devout Presbyterian minister, kept some 
distance from Jefferson, whose relationship with religion was 
controversial at best within the evangelical community. Howison 
observed that "Thomas Jefferson was not a believer in Christian-
ity as divine, or in Christ as God. It is doubtful whether he was a 
simple Deist or a Unitarian."61 Nevertheless, Jefferson, "though 
infidel in his opinions," had applied sound reason to the question 
of religious liberty, and "[t]hus may it happen that the most 
learned of infidels, and the most enlightened of Christians, may 
attain to the same conclusions as to religious liberty. "62 As 
Howison tells the story, even while "Jefferson was embodying 
his views in definite form [in the Statute for Religious Freedom], 
a number of consecrated minds were at work on the same sub-
ject. "63 In fact, the Virginia Presbyterians to whom Bancroft had 
referred in his letter to Waite (Bancroft had said that the Statute 
for Religious Freedom was "accepted alike by the friends of Jef-
ferson, and the Presbyterians of Virginia") had been inspired to 
58. 11 THE BIBLICAL REPERTORY AND PRINCETON REVIEW 187 (April 1848); 14 
SOUTHERN LITERARY MESSENGER 342-43 (June 1848). 
59. 2 HOWISON, supra note 31, at 298. 
60. /d. at 299, 333. 
61. /d. at 298-99. 
62. /d. at 299. 
63. /d. 
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send a series of five memorials to the General Assembly of Vir-
ginia between 1775 and 1786 concerning the proper relationship 
of church and state. According to Presbyterian Howison, "a 
careful analysis of these documents will draw from them every 
material argument and principle, that will be found embodied in 
the 'Act for Establishing Religious Freedom,' written by Mr. Jef-
ferson."64 Howison does not further explore whose ideas actually 
informed the drafting of the statute, be they inspired or infidel, 
but whatever their source, "all who love liberty have admired it, 
and will support it unto the end. "65 
Howison's description of the adoption of Jefferson's reli-
gious freedom bill in 1784 begins with a discussion of the legisla-
tive proposals for a general assessment, which was essentially a 
broad-based tax for the support of religion. According to 
Howison, the "bill required that all taxable persons should, at 
the time of giving in a list of their tithes, declare to what religious 
society they wished their assessments appropriated; and if they 
failed so to declare, the sums assessed on them were to be ap-
propriated to seminaries of learning in their counties."66 This bill 
had the blessing of the extremely influential Patrick Henry, who 
not only gave it his "cordial support,'' but also urged the "incor-
poration of all societies of the Christian religion,'' a legal device 
that would permit religious organizations themselves to hold title 
to property.67 Until that point, the property of churches was sub-
ject either to legislative action, in the case of the legally estab-
lished church, or to the whims of the lay leadership of any 
church not so established. Following its disestablishment, the 
Episcopal Church had applied to be incorporated. Howison de-
scribes the potential for abuse from incorporation as follows: 
"the Episcopal Church would now be confirmed by law in the 
possession of property, the great body of which had been taken 
from the people under the requirements of the old system [i.e., 
when it had been the legally established church]. And farther, its 
ministries and vestries were furnished with a legal energy which 
would incessantly prompt them to measures for acquiring prop-
erty and gaining temporal power. "68 
In response, "[t]he friends of liberty took the alarm,'' in-
cluding both the Presbyterians and the Baptists, especially as the 
64. !d. at 299-300. 
65. /d. at 301. 
66. /d. at 296-97. 
67. I d. at 294-95 (emphasis omitted). 
68. I d. at 296. 
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"question of assessment had become prominent. "69 The legisla-
ture deferred the assessment bill "in order that by the next ses-
sion, the popular feeling respecting it might be known," thus 
"[e]xciting debates" in many counties.70 Amidst these debates 
came a "memorial against the bill prepared by James Madison," 
which, in Howison's estimation, is "one of the best compositions 
ever produced, even by his great mind."71 Howison then goes on 
to summarize at some length Madison's memorial against the as-
sessment, noting, in a footnote, that it could "be seen in Appen-
dix to Semple's Va. Baptists .... "72 This footnote is undoubtedly 
the source of Chief Justice Waite's reference in the Reynolds 
opinion that Madison's Memorial could be found in Semple's 
work since it is unlikely that Waite, having been directed by 
Bancroft to "the friends of Jefferson and the Presbyterians of 
Virginia," would have independently sought out a history of the 
Baptists. Ultimately, Howison extols Madison's document, 
showing an enthusiasm unrestrained by the concerns he ex-
pressed towards Jefferson's unconsecrated mind. Referring to 
Madison's memorial, he writes, "Transparent in style, moderate 
yet firm in temper, graceful in proportion, stron~ in argument, it 
treats its subject with a power not to be resisted." 3 
Later in the volume, Howison makes the case for Virginia's 
catalytic role in bringing about the Bill of Rights. His analysis 
begins with the 1788 debates in Virginia concerning the ratifica-
tion of the Constitution, in which James Madison, "the success-
ful champion of the Constitution," and others "who defended 
the Constitution, presented it as a system beautifully adapted to 
their wants, and well fitted to cover the chasm left by the Con-
federation," whereas "those who opposed it [most notably Pat-
rick Henry] declaimed against it as a monster, dangerous in his 
single traits, and in his full development."74 One of the principal 
objections to the Constitution by Patrick Henry and the Anti-
Federalists was its lack of a Bill of Rights, which Howison notes, 
in a footnote, "was [also] Mr. Jefferson's leading objection. He 
was in Paris at the time, but he wrote a letter about the New 
Government to James Madison .... "75 Some Virginians, such as 
69. !d. 
70. !d. at 296-97 
71. /d. at 297. 
72. !d. at n.(b). In fact, Howison cites Semple's volume three separate times in his 
two page description of the assessment controversy. 
73. !d. 
74. !d. at 321, 325. 
75. /d. at 330 n.(b ). 
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Patrick Henry and his followers, wanted their ratification of the 
Constitution to be conditioned upon the inclusion of certain 
amendments, whereas others favored amendments, but only as a 
recommendation for the future. 
At this point, Howison makes a genuinely remarkable 
statement about Virginia's unique role in First Amendment his-
tory. He says that he does not have to comment at length on the 
specific elements of the Virginia proposals for a federal Bill of 
Rights because, in his view, they are "reflected in the Amend-
ments to the Constitution, which Virginia advised .... "76 A 
number of proposed amendments, which "were nearly identical 
with those previously offered by Patrick Henry," in his unsuc-
cessful effort to obtain only a conditional ratification of the Con-
stitution, "were assembled by a committee and proposed to the 
new government."77 Ultimately, Howison concludes, "Nearly 
every material change suggested by Virginia was adopted. For, 
one article of amendment provided for freedom in religion, and 
of speech, and of the press .... "78 Howison is so certain of the 
Virginia origins of this constitutional amendment that he urges 
his readers, in a footnote to the preceding sentence, to "Collate 
Amend. art. iii [that is, the provision adopted by the First Con-
gress that becomes the First Amendment] with Virginia pro-
posed Bill of Rights, art. 15, 16, 20."79 Virginia's proposed 
amendment relating to religion (proposal number 20) began with 
a quotation from Virginia's 1776 bill of rights ("That religion or 
the duty that we owe to our creator ... can be directed only by 
reason and conviction ... ") and ended as follows: "therefore all 
men have an equal, natural, and unalienable right to the free ex-
ercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience, and 
that no particular religious sect or society ou~ht to be favored or 
established by law, in preference to others." After linking Vir-
ginia's proposed amendment about religion directly to the First 
Amendment, Howison goes on to list the other elements of the 
Bill of Rights and likens them to their Virginia forebears. 81 
While there are certainly linguistic differences between the 
Virginia proposals and the final form of the Bill of Rights, espe-
76. /d. at 331. 
77. /d. at 332. 
78. /d. at 333. 
79. /d. at n.(a). 
80. 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGIITS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
842 (1971). 
81. See HOWISON, supra note 31, at 333 nn.(b)-(d). 
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cially in the religion clauses, Howison looks past the semantic is-
sues to the broader question that seemed also to be at the heart 
of Bancroft's advice to Waite- that is, what were the ideological 
or political origins of the provisions, rather than who wrote the 
specific language. In this regard, it is intriguing to follow the 
stream of Howison's commentary back to its source. For, in his 
view, the specific amendments proferred by Virginia emerged 
initially not from Jefferson or Madison, but from Patrick Henry, 
who had originally proposed them as part of an effort to bring 
about a conditional ratification. Since much of the modem re-
search into the ideological pedigree of the First Amendment has 
been designed to determine whether there should either be a 
strict separation of church and state or a more accomodationist 
stance-in either case, based upon an analysis of the writings 
and actions of the most relevant framers-it is interesting to note 
here that Howison traces the lineage of the Virginia amend-
ments back to Patrick Henry, who had championed the general 
assessment bill, which sounds, to modern ears, like a broadly 
non-preferential proposal. Virginia's proposed amendment ("no 
particular religious sect or society ought to be favored or estab-
lished by law, in preference to others") certainly reads broadly 
enough on its face to permit the kind of non-denominational as-
sessment that Henry had supported, but that Howison himself 
did not favor. Chief Justice Waite, of course, is searching for 
signs of Jefferson and Madison, so he overlooks Patrick Henry's 
contribution to the Virginia debate. 
In the conclusion of Howison's two volume History of Vir-
ginia, when he seeks to encapsulate the contributions of the Old 
Dominion to the new nation, freedom of religion-and the 
transmission of that commitment to liberty of conscience from 
Virginia to the national government-again holds pride of place: 
We have seen that when she first became independent of the 
mother country, she adopted, with singular directness of pur-
pose, measures necessary to secure civil and religious freedom 
within her own borders. We have seen that when the pro-
posed union was presented, she ... subjected it to the ordeal 
of minds keen, brilliant, learned, and ardently in love with lib-
erty .... We have seen that even in the act of receiving it, 
she ... sought with success, to infuse into its soul some of her 
own healthful qualities; that she procured amendments guar-
antying the natural rights and the first interests of man.82 
82. /d. at 334. 
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Howison's two-volume history thus not only reinforced Ban-
croft's opinion that the ideological origins of the First Amend-
ment's religion clause could be found in Virginia, but it also pro-
vided a wealth of impressively footnoted material locating 
Virginia as the wellspring of the Constitution's respect for indi-
vidual rights. These rights were cast both in constitutional lan-
guage and in the cadence and phrasings of the Baptists' and 
Presbyterians' enduring commitment to religious freedom and, 
in Howison's view, its necessary corollary, the complete separa-
tion of church and state. 
While it is possible that Howison was Chief Justice Waite's 
sole published source for his historical background, it is likely 
that for the specific history of the development of religious free-
dom in that state, the jurist followed Howison's footnote trail to 
the work of a Baptist minister and native son who similarly 
found the inspiration for religious freedom and disestablish-
mentarianism in Virginia-Robert Semple, whose Virginia Bap-
tists, contained a complete copy of Madison's Memorial and 
Remonstrance. 
Semple's Virginia Baptists is a wonderfully engaging, 
learned and felicitously written 400-page chronicle of the ex-
ploits of the Baptists in Virginia, from their arrival early in the 
eighteenth century until the volume was published in 1810. 
While the thought of a lengthy church-by-church, county-by-
county litany of preachers and penitents might seem soporific to 
all but the most dedicated church historians, Semple's warm and 
affectionate descriptions of his fellow Baptists, combined with 
his sharp and detailed analysis of the history of their persecution 
by Virginia and its established church, make for fascinating read-
ing. 
Semple's history begins with a brief discussion of the "Ori-
gin of the Separate Baptists," dating to 1714, with waves of Bap-
tist immigration from England, Maryland and New England. In 
the middle of the eighteenth century, the evangelical efforts of 
numerous Baptist preachers-"[m]ost of them illiterate, yet il-
lumined by the wisdom from above"83 -led to the rapid growth 
of Baptists in the state. These successes brought unwanted atten-
tion from the "established religion: the Nebuchadnezzars of the 
age .... "84 Chapter III of Semple's tome is then dedicated to a 
history of the Baptists from "the commencement of Legal Perse-
83. SEMPLE, supra note 3, at 11. 
84. ld. 
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cution until the Abolition of the Established Church. "85 It is very 
likely that Chief Justice Waite concentrated on this chapter in 
his research into Virginia's pre-constitutional church-state bat-
tles; its discussion of the treatment of the Baptists and other dis-
senting groups, culminating in Madison's Memorial and Remon-
strance, is neatly summarized in Waite's opinion. 
While Semple sets out to write a history of the Baptists in 
Virginia, he makes sure to point out that other dissenting groups 
experienced similar forms of persecution. The Quakers, for ex-
ample, suffered "the utmost degree of persecution"86 from the 
time of their arrival many years before the Baptists. At the same 
time, as early as the seventeenth century, the State provided 
generous tax support for the established Anglican church, whose 
priests were well paid and whose churches amply supported by 
broad-based taxes. Additionally, by statute, onl~ Anglican minis-
ters could legally perform wedding ceremonies. 7 
Semple observes that, unlike the harsh treatment of the 
Quakers, there were no specific laws against the Baptists' evan-
gelical efforts, but the "law for the preservation of peace ... was 
so interpreted as to answer this purpose. "88 The first case re-
ported by Semple was in June 1768, when several Baptist 
preachers were apprehended on the grounds that "they cannot 
meet a man upon the road, but they must ram a text of scripture 
down his throat. "89 They were imprisoned for several weeks, and 
commenced the practice of preaching through the bars to any-
one who would gather near the jail, a practice that seemed to be 
especially effective, and perhaps increasingly necessary, as more 
and more Baptist preachers were incarcerated. In the face of 
harassment and increasing instances of imprisonment, the Bap-
tists, writes Semple, "were unremitting in their exertions to ob-
tain liberty of conscience," arguing "that they were entitled to 
the same privileges that were enjoyed by the dissenters in Eng-
land." 90 Since they were not able to avoid these breach-of-the-
peace detentions, they reluctantly sought preaching licenses 
from the state. But even success in securing some official preach-
85. /d. at 14. 
86. /d. at 29. 
87. /d. at 34. 
88. /d. at 15. 
89. /d. 
90. /d. at 23-24. 
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ing licenses did not satisfy the Baptists who "thirsted for the lib-
erty to preach the gospel to every creature."91 
Despite imprisonment and harassment (or perhaps because 
of this attention), the Baptist ranks swelled so dramatically in 
the early 1770's that "they began to entertain serious hopes, not 
only of obtaining liberty of conscience, but, of actually overturn-
ing the church establishment, from whence, all their oppressions 
had arisen. "92 In support of this effort, petitions were circulated, 
and "[vJast numbers readily, and indeed eagerly, subscribed to 
them."9 The religious and political winds were inexorably shift-
ing in favor of the Baptists and religious freedom. Semple the 
preacher wanted to be sure to give first credit to the "power of 
God," but, Semple qua historian made sure to present a more 
complex and realistic picture of the "subordinate and co-
operating causes."94 The main one, he posits, was the "loose and 
immoral deportment of the established clergy"95 joined by a 
growing revolutionary spirit that was embraced by the Baptists, 
whereas the established church was seen as one of the "insepa-
rable appendages ofMonarchy."96 Finally, whereas Bancroft and 
Howison award substantial credit to the Presbyterians, Semple 
observes that although the Baptists were not alone in effecting 
"this important ecclesiastical revolution," they were "certainll 
the most active; but they were also joined by other dissenters. "9 
Ultimately, following the presentation of numerous memo-
rials from a variety of dissenting religious groups, in October 
1776, Virginia passed a law "suspending the payment of salaries 
formerly allowed to the ministers of the church of England. "98 
Semple writes that the memorials "formed the basis of the act," 
which exempted "the different societies of dissenters from con-
tributing to the support and maintenance of the church .... "99 By 
1779, all statutes providing for the payment of Anglican salaries 
were repealed, and Semple recommends to his readers that the 
preamble of this law is especially "worthy of consideration, and 
was probably drawn by Mr. Jefferson .... "100 
91. /d. at 24. 




96. /d. at 26-27. 
97. /d. at 26. 
98. /d. at 32. 
99. /d. 
100. /d. 
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To be fair, Semple notes that "many of the Episcopalians, 
who voted for abolishing the establishment, did it, upon an ex-
pectation that it would be succeeded by a general assessment." 101 
This was not to be the case in 1776: "the war now rising ... they 
were in too much need of funds, to permit any of their resources, 
to be devoted to any other purpose .... "102 Several years later, 
in 1784, the general assessment proposal returned, leading to a 
"bill, which had for its object the compelling of every person to 
contribute to some religious teacher .... "103 This bill, referred to 
by Chief Justice Waite in Reynolds, "drew forth a number of 
able and animated memorials from religious societies of differ-
ent denominations .... "104 Among all of these documents, ac-
cording to Semple, "a paper drawn up by Col. James Madison 
(now President of the United States), intituled [sic] 'A Memorial 
and Remonstrance,' will ever hold a most distinguished place. 
For elegance of style, strength of reasoning, and purity of princi-
ple, it has, perhaps, seldom been equaled; certainly never sur-
passed by anything in the English language."105 He was so moved 
by Madison's Memorial that he attached a copy of the document 
as the only Appendix to the lengthy volume. 
Interestingly, Semple's chapter ends with no mention of Jef-
ferson's religious freedom statute; instead, the dissenters, in 
combination with the persuasive power of Madison's Memorial 
and Remonstrance, were credited by Semple with securing the 
defeat of the general assessment bill, which appears to be the 
climax of the entire church-state discussion. It takes another 
forty pages, during a long and detailed discussion of the lobbying 
efforts of the General Association of the Baptists, before Semple 
reaches the bill for religious freedom. Noting that the general as-
sessment law did not pass, Semple observes that "on the con-
trary, an act explaining the nature of religious liberty" was 
adopted. 106 This law, writes Semple, "so much admired for the 
lucid manner, in which it treats of, and explains religious liberty, 
was drawn by the venerable Mr. Thomas Jefferson."107 With this 
much delayed coda about Jefferson's bill, Semple concludes his 
discussion of the battles for religious freedom and returns to the 
story of the Baptist churches and their leaders. 
101. /d. at 27. 
102. /d. 
103. /d. at 33. 
104. /d. 
105. /d. 
106. /d. at 72. 
107. /d. 
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WHICH HISTORY? 
Thanks to Bancroft's advice to Waite that he follow the 
pathway to Thomas Jefferson and Virginia, the Chief Justice lo-
cated the heart of the First Amendment's religion clauses in 
what we might now call the ardently strict separationist branch 
of the church-state debate. United in their disdain for the his-
torically established Anglican Church and their belief in reli-
gious freedom as a natural right, "infidels" (mostly Jefferson) 
and the devoutly consecrated Presbyterians and Baptists-with 
perhaps Madison somewhere in between108 -joined in a battle 
against a broad-based tax in support of religion that stimulated 
thoughtful and eminently quotable apologies for religious liberty 
and disestablishmentarianism. Their effect on the unfortunate 
Mr. Reynolds' religious freedom defense was marginal at best, 
but their influence on the future course of establishment clause 
jurisprudence is profound indeed. 
For the Chief Justice to reach a decision in the Reynolds 
case-bearing in mind that his assignment was to craft an opin-
ion for the majority who voted to sustain the conviction- he 
needed to work around the odes to religious liberty that he 
found in the words of Jefferson and Madison as well as in the 
writings of the Baptists and Presbyterians. Only by drawing on 
Jefferson's final qualifying phrases (e.g., when religious actions 
"break out into overt acts against peace and good order") in the 
Virginia Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, and by citing 
Virginia's subsequent action making bigamy a capital offense, 
does Waite in effect rescue his opinion from the torrent of Vir-
ginia writings and history that could easily have pushed the deci-
sion in the opposite direction. 
What is fascinating about the Chief Justice's opinion is the 
degree to which Waite's historical research drew him so deeply 
into the Virginia vortex as he searched for the inspiration for the 
religion clauses. The historians consulted by Waite were never 
shy about the Old Dominion's pivotal position in the develop-
ment of religious freedom. In Bancroft, he found a Jeffersonian 
who believed, among other things, that the civil rights legislated 
in Virginia announced "principles for all peoples in all future 
time." Moving on to Howison, he encountered a Virginian who 
108. There has been some controversy over the extent of Madison's personal religi-
osity. For a discussion of this topic, see Ralph L. Ketcham, James Madison and Religion: 
A New Hypothesis, in ROBERT S. ALLEY, JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 
175-% (1985). 
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believed that the Commonwealth "has exerted an influence 
upon the fate of America that may well draw to her progress that 
notice of all who hope to find in the past, lessons for future gen-
erations."109 For Howison, the First Amendment was little more 
than a virtual reprinting of Virginia's proposals, which were born 
of the unhappy experiences of the Presbyterians, Baptists and 
other dissenting religious groups. Howison led Waite to Semple 
and his history of the Virginia Baptists, whose story would serve 
not only as a guidepost for the proper relation of church and 
state for what Howison called "future generations," but ex-
tended to eternal priorities as well. Semple believed that the 
"rise and rapid spread of the Baptists in Virginia were so re-
markable, that there are but few, who do not believe that some 
historical relation of them will be productive of real advantage to 
true religion." 110 In light of the degree to which Bancroft, 
Howison and Semple link the Virginia experience to the devel-
opment of civil rights generally, it is easy to see how Chief Jus-
tice Waite would become so focused on the Virginia origins of 
the First Amendment, especially since his entire research effort 
took place over a few weeks that included the Christmas holi-
days. 
CONCLUSION 
It is interesting to hypothesize about why Chief Justice 
Waite went so far out of his way to invoke the strict separationist 
language from Madison and Jefferson when little, if any, was 
needed to address Mr. Reynolds' religious freedom defense. We 
could, for example, speculate that Waite's opinion was designed 
not only to dash the Mormon hopes of a constitutional right to 
engage in religiously mandated polygamy, but also to send a 
message that the ecclesiastically dominated Territory of Utah 
would find the establishment clause to be an inhospitable envi-
ronment for entry into statehood. In this connection, it is note-
worthy that the 1888 Republican platform supported "appropri-
ate legislation asserting the sovereignty of the nation in all 
territories where the same is questioned, and in furtherance of 
that end to place upon the statute-books legislation stringent 
enough to divorce the political from the ecclesiastical power, and 
thus stamp out the attendant wickedness of polygamy." 111 Yet 
109. HOWISON supra, note 31, at 22. 
II 0. SEMPLE, supra note 3, at v. 
Ill. T.H. MCKEE, NATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND PLATFORMS OF ALL POLITICAL 
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there is no evidence that Waite had any intention of sending this 
type of message. 
We could also posit that Waite had a personal commitment 
to a rigorous separation of church and state, and he seized the 
opportunity in Reynolds to endow those views with a constitu-
tional mandate. It seems unlikely that Waite was a dogmatic 
strict separationist, however. In his capacity as chancellor of the 
Smithsonian Institution, he wrote a note on the subject of 
whether it would be appropriate to open the museum on Sun-
days. The correspondence shows more of a pragmatic view than 
a strictly principled one: 
I will go as far as anyone to promote the observance of the 
Sabbath, and to make it a day of holy thoughts, but I am by 
no means certain that the opening of the ... Smithsonian ... 
may not conduce to that end .... My idea is, if you can't make 
people as good as you wish, make them as good as you can. 
Education at the Smithsonian may send some to church. At 
any rate it is not likely to make anyone who wants to go there 
worse.
112 
Biographer Magrath, noting that Waite was a life-long "low-
church Episcopalian" and church leader, sees Waite's position 
here as very much in keeping with his "great practicality."113 
Alternatively, we could imagine that the Chief Justice sim-
ply wanted to do his friend Bancroft a favor by following his Jef-
fersonian predilections. But Waite did not always follow Ban-
croft's advice or his research into constitutional history. Bancroft 
strongly opposed paper money, which the Waite court permitted 
in Julliard v. Greenman. Knowing Bancroft's views on the sub-
ject, Waite invited him to attend the session of the Supreme 
Court when the decision was being announced. Shocked that the 
Court had not followed his guidance, Bancroft wrote the follow-
ing to Waite afterwards: "I never in my life have been so sur-
prised as when I caught the nature of the decision of the Court. I 
had before its delivery given the most full attention to the sub-
ject and had expressed in my History of the Formation of the 
Constitution the conclusion at which I arrived. I have again ex-
PARTIES, 1789-1905: CONVENTION, POPULAR AND ELECTORAL VOTE 242 (1972). 
112. C. PETER MAGRATH, MORRISON R .WAITE; THE TRIUMPH OF CHARACTER 
305--06 (1963). 
113. /d. 
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amined the question and have been perfectly reassured that the 
historical statement I had published is entirely correct .... "114 
There may be numerous explanations for why Waite wrote 
the Reynolds opinion the way he did, but there is scant evidence 
to support any but the most simple and straightforward: he be-
lieved that he had accurately captured the spirit of the religion 
clauses through his historical research. As his biographer Peter 
Magrath has documented, Chief Justice Waite felt that he, as 
Chief Justice, had a special responsibility for constitutional cases, 
and it appears that he switched his vote in Reynolds specifically 
to be able to write the majority opinion. The religion clauses be-
ing virgin constitutional territory, he did a reasonable thing and 
asked George Bancroft, an eminent historian of America and 
the American constitution (who happened to be a friend as 
well), to give him insight into the background of the First 
Amendment. Bancroft obliged by providing Waite with a refer-
ence to Jefferson and Virginia. Once on the path to Virginia, 
Waite not only happened upon the works of Jefferson and Madi-
son but he also fell under the influence of minister-historians 
Howison and Semple, who placed Virginia disestablishmentari-
anism at the center of American freedoms. While Bancroft 
sought to award the historical accolades to Jefferson, Howison 
and Semple claimed the operational credit for the Presbyterians 
and the Baptists but were perfectly happy to embrace Jefferson's 
and Madison's writings because they persuasively and felici-
tously made the case for the dissenting churches' approach tore-
ligious liberty and disestablishment. It is hard to know whether 
the writings of these two Virginia historians influenced Ban-
croft's views but, ultimately, it was the combined power of a con-
sistent historical message from all three historians that provided 
Chief Justice Waite with a full-fledged theory of the Virginia dis-
establishmentarian origins of the religion clauses of the First 
Amendment. And there is little doubt that this theory meshed 
well with prevailing opinions on the subject in the late 1870s 
when the Reynolds case was decided. 
As Philip Hamburger demonstrates in his recent book, 
Separation of Church and State, the strict separationist view that 
was adopted by Chief Justice Waite in Reynolds had settled into 
American zeitgeist by the latter portion of the nineteenth cen-
tury. 115 A combination of liberal secularism, "traditional fears 
114. TRIMBLE, supra note 16, at 288. See Julliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421 (1884). 
115. PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 191-284 (2002). See 
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about the anti-Christian character of Catholicism and its union 
of church and state"116 and a host of other factors contributed to 
a widespread belief by people inhabiting an impressive range of 
other positions on the political spectrum that the separation of 
church and state was one of the cornerstones of American de-
mocracy. For example, historian Philip Schaff observed in an in-
fluential 1888 essay titled, "Church and State in the United 
States," that "Liberty, both civil and religious, is an American 
instinct .... Such liberty is impossible on the basis of a union of 
church and state . . . . It requires a friendly separation, where 
each is entirely independent in its own sphere." 117 As Ham-
burger puts it, by the 1870s, "the separation of church and state 
had become an almost irresistible dogma of American-
ism .... "118 In this environment, it is hardly surprising that Jus-
tice Waite found the Virginia disestablishmentarian history of 
the First Amendment so convincing or that he found Jefferson's 
"wall of separation" language so compelling. 
Hamburger's analysis suggests that a considerable amount 
of strict separationist doctrine was espoused by those geographi-
cally or politically close to Waite, but there seems to be no evi-
dence that Waite himself had strong views on the subject. Presi-
dent Grant, who was at one time a member of the Know 
Nothings, proposed in 1875 "a constitutional amendment sepa-
rating church from state-particularly, the Catholic Church from 
the American states." 119 Meanwhile, at the opposite end of the 
political spectrum, the Toledo Liberal Alliance, which became a 
national movement, made the separation of church and state its 
unifying theme in the early 1870s, at a time when Waite was liv-
ing in Toledo.120 By the 1870s and 1880s both liberals and nativ-
ists began to shift their strategy from securing a constitutional 
amendment mandating the separation of church and state to 
making arguments that "this ideal had been secured in the U.S. 
Constitution and even the First Amendment. "121 At the same 
time, Protestant leaders sought ways to claim historical credit for 
also JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATIERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM 1860-
1925 (1973), and JOAN DElFATTORE, THE FOURTH R: CONFLICTS OVER RELIGION IN 
AMERICA'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS (2004). 
116. HAMBURGER, supra note 115, at 202. 
117. Philip Schaff, Church and State in the United States, in 2 PAPERS OF THE 
AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION 10 (1888). 
118. HAMBURGER supra note 115, at 270-71. 
119. /d. at 322. See also 4 CONG. REC. 175, 181 (1875). 
120. /d. at 289-96. 
12 I. /d. at 342. 
2004] REYNOLDS v. UNITED STATES 725 
their respective churches for the principle of the separation of 
church and state, and, in Hamburger's words, "this seemed to 
confirm that separation had been guaranteed in American con-
stitutions."122 Of course, Waite's own Episcopal denomination-
heir to the Anglican Church that had been disestablished in Vir-
ginia-was unlikely to compete for these honors. But there can 
be little doubt that separation was "in the air" during the time 
the Reynolds case was decided. 
While the Reynolds opinion undoubtedly captured the spirit 
of its era, much could be critiqued in Chief Justice Waite's rendi-
tion of the history of the separation of church and state. In his 
historical summary of the origins of the religious clauses, he left 
out the enigmatic debates of the first Congress, the state ratify-
ing debates, any hint of a role played by the Anti-Federalists, the 
contributions to American church-state thinking from people 
like John Winthrop, William Penn, Roger Williams, Isaac 
Backus, John Witherspoon and others, widely read constitu-
tional commentaries from nineteenth-century luminaries like 
Story and Cooley, the tax-supported churches in New England 
that endured well into the nineteenth century, and a host of 
other documents and events that could potentially be relevant to 
a comprehensive treatment of the subject. But to his credit, in a 
single holiday-filled month, he fashioned a plausible political and 
intellectual history of the religion clauses that has stood the test 
of time. And with respect to the establishment clause in particu-
lar, he did so with no apparent intentions other than to get it 
right. In doing so, he ultimately fell under the influence of dises-
tablishmentarian historians whose fellow Baptists and Presbyte-
rians, to gain political advantage in their battles against Vir-
ginia's establishment, embraced the bills of the "infidel" 
Jefferson and rescued Madison's Memorial and Remembrance 
from relative political obscurity (since other petitions on the sub-
ject had attracted far more signatures). 
In the end of Chief Justice Waite's version of the history, 
the evangelicals who won the political victories-and whose his-
torians told the tale-fall from view, but their commitment to 
disestablishment endures through the lingering effects of a 
Madisonian-Jeffersonian interpretation of the establishment 
clause. It is perhaps ironic that what we now tend to see as the 
Enlightenment-inspired doctrine of non-establishment heralded 
in the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom and Madison's 
122. /d. at 352. 
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Memorial and Remonstrance was in fact not only made politi-
cally possible by the active campaigns of evangelical protestants 
highly distrustful of Enlightenment thinking, but was shepherded 
into constitutional doctrine by deeply devout Baptist and Pres-
byterian historians proudly claiming credit for a First Amend-
ment whose origins were undoubtedly much more complex and 
variegated than local Virginia battles over a weak and unpopular 
Anglican establishment. 
In summary, it would be unfair to accuse Chief Justice 
Waite of engaging in the law office history of twentieth century 
establishment clause controversies. To the contrary, what we see 
in Reynolds is a case study of constitutional creation ex nihilo. It 
is the historians Waite consulted who took the church-state 
question down a somewhat more narrow path than it deserved, 
not in hopes of influencing constitutional interpretation in the 
future but simply to tell the story in a fashion that provided 
maximum credit to those whom-they believed-most deserved 
it. And in viewing Waite's interpolation of that history into the 
Court's first foray into the religion clauses, we can see the his-
torical construction of what has become constitutional reality. 
